SEAFOOD.COM
NEWS by John Sackton - Oct 22, 2009 [News Analysis] - Although unable
to personally attend the catch share meeting this week in Bretton Woods
due to a prior commitment, the issue at stake: can the system of IFQ's
and catch shares established successfully in Alaska be replicated in
New England - is near and dear. For years I have contrasted the
experience of Alaska, with a system of hard TAC's and fishery closures
when catch targets or by-catch limits are reached, with the system in
New England that for the past 15 years has relied on imprecise attempts
to control effort.
In one setting, the industry has thrived,
value of the fisheries had dramatically increased, and the degree of
Alaskan ownership of vessels has increased.
In the other
setting, the value of the industry has plummeted, historic ports are
seeing near record low levels of landings, and the management has
become one huge fight of industry vs science due to the increasingly
absurd contortions being asked of the industry.
Anyone who cares about the New England fisheries knows that change is necessary.
When
the Magnuson - Stevens Act was reauthorized in 2006, the big regional
fight was over whether the system of hard quotas established on the
West coast would become mandatory nationally. Environmental groups
strongly supported the provision, while in New England, it was fiercely
opposed. New England lost that battle, and now is operating under a
legal requirement to meet hard quotas for each species of a 13 species
groundfish complex in 19 separate management units.
The magnuson
act also provided strong support for ITQ systems, also called catch
shares, under which vessels in a fishery are assigned a proportion of
the quota based on their fishing history. About 14 years earlier, a
moratorium had been placed on catch shares after two experiences with
northeast surf clams, and Alaskan halibut and sablefish. Both programs
led to major changes in their respective industries. The moratorium was
to allow more consideration of the types of changes catch shares
brought about.
Subsequently, both the Alaska pollock program,
under the American fisheries act, and the crab rationalization program,
were enacted by an Act of Congress, due to the moratorium on catch
share programs in place. This moratorium was lifted in 2006, giving
regional management councils authority to establish catch share systems.
With
this as background, the New England management council, under strong
pressure from NOAA and the legal requirements of Magnuson, adopted a
modified catch share system to come into effect in 2010. The system
would not provide individual quotas, but assign vessels to voluntary
sectors, which could then pool their quotas, and act like FCMA co-ops,
i.e. decide which vessels should fish and when and make payments to
members based on their share of history.
One of the biggest
problems in New England was that the prior system - days at sea - made
no distinction in fishing permits. There are thousands of fishing
permits in New England, many of them dormant, and under the old system,
each permit had the same right to be allocated days at sea. Quickly a
leasing program came into being where active vessels would lease
additional days at sea rights from inactive vessels. Yet since the pool
was based on the total number of permits, no effective consolidation
took place.
The looseness of this system allowed anyone to still
enter the fishery, so long as they could find a cheap permit and days
at sea to lease from another permit holder. The value of dormant
permits was not that great, and they could easily be bought.
Under
the catch share allocation, what matters is fishing history, not the
existence of the permit itself. Suddenly, boats who have come into the
fishery recently find themselves with insufficient history. Those who
understood the system bought permits with established history, which
were much more valuable than permits with no history. Much of the
outcry in New England against catch shares is due to this change in
status.
A second problem, exacerbating the transition, is the
current state of recovery of fish stocks. In a species complex of 13
species in 19 management stocks, the expectation that all will or can
achieve their maximum biological potential at the same time is
scientifically impossible. Yet Magnuson allows for no flexibility on
this point. The result is that much of the fishing effort in New
England is dictated by the weakest species. Under Magnuson, weaker
species with stocks that are below the target spawning threshold must
be protected and rebuilt.
New England is put in an impossible
position: there is no way except perhaps with a 10 or 20 year
moratorium on all fishing, that the 13 groundfish species could
readjust to their natural proportions - which have not existed on
Georges Bank for more than 100 years.
In fact, the idea that New
England can go back to some pre-fishing mix of species abundance is
absurd. The egg is scrambled. It cannot be reconstituted as an egg. Yet
much of the current science and management is still based on control of
discrete species with the goal of producing a new egg (the original
spawning biomass) - and that ties New England fishermen in knots and
makes them think the goals are simply irrational.
The meeting
in Bretton Woods this week was really just a workshop to address some
of the issues in catch shares. It got a high profile because, first, it
was by invitation, and secondly, it had the full support of NOAA which
is committed to implementing catch shares as a national fishing
strategy.
The meeting addressed some of the design issues in
catch shares, and the fundamental problem: there is a trade-off in
implementing catch shares.
In order to make existing fleets
efficient and profitable, they have to shrink - capacity has to match
the stock available for harvest, instead of being two, three or four
times greater than needed. Catch shares are principally a market
mechanism to make that happen - by allowing consolidation to the degree
that the fishery is conducted efficiently, and compensating those who
leave the fishery by paying the market value for their shares. This is
what allowed the Alaska crab fleet to move rapidly from 280 boats to 80
active boats.
The question is what is lost in a pure market
mechanism. Catch share programs have to be implemented so as to not
magnify negative consequences. In Alaska, one consequence of the rapid
consolidation was an outcry over loss of crew jobs.
How do you
preserve the structure of the industry in New England - a mix of
smaller inshore and larger boats, a mix of ports all with some
landings, and a wide range of specializations on certain types of fish.
A
common argument of those against catch shares is that it destroys
existing communities, by allowing boats and landings to be bought and
concentrated elsewhere. This is not a feature of catch share per se,
but of poor design.
At the conference, Wes Erikson, a 4th
generation British Columbia fishermen talked about catch shares and
impacts on communities. Contrary to some reporting that communities
shrunk as a result of the catch share program, he said that communities
in British Colombia were 'negatively impacted by the shrinking of the
commercial salmon industry which is not a catch share fishery.'
'In
fact, under catch shares, commercial landings have actually increased
in coastal communities and decreased in urban centers. For the most
part catch shares have been a positive aspect for the coastal
communities that I work and live in', he said.
Steve Minor, from
Alaska, also addressed the community issue. He said 'Catch Shares in
the Bering Sea crab industry have in fact been created positive
benefits for crab-dependent communities, because we designed our
program with that goal in mind. Crab dependent communities are now
guaranteed abut 90% of their historic share of landings based on the
delivery requirements we placed on the quota shares themselves.'
There
is absolutely no reason why the New England program should not contain
a strong community protection component. Ports like Portland,
Gloucester, and Boston, should all have consideration under the program
so that provisions are made to restrict wholesale transfer of shares
away from traditional landing ports.
There is nothing in the
current design of a program that would prevent for example, a sector
consisting of Maine and Massachusetts boats assigning all of their
quota to be landed in one port only.
Once shares are bought and
sold, as they will be inevitably in any system, the lack of such
protections leaves the fishing infrastructure in New England badly
exposed.
The program in Bretton Woods did not solve the probems, but did help to get some of the issues on the table.
The
thing that most upsets New England fishermen is that they feel they are
being forced to forego legitimate harvests for very unsound scientific
reasons. Catch shares don't determine the level of the catch, but have
become a lightning rod for all the issues affecting New England, since
they represent a new approach that New England has traditionally
resisted.
The most telling fact is that the vessels with real
catch history are flocking to the program. Estimates are that holders
of 90 to 95% of the catch history for most species have signed on to
the sector program. These fishermen represent the ones who have most
successfully navigated the management contortions of the past decade.
Given the transition that is necessary, it is obvious that some
flexibility on management goals would help tremendously.
Such
flexibility has often been accepted by NMFS in the past. In the Alaska
opilio fishery this year, when rigid adherence to a rebuilding plan
would have resulted in a dramatic cut back, or possibly no fishery at
all, NMFS adjusted the goal, and allowed a new rebuilding plan to be
put in place. As a result, the crab fishery remained viable.
One
reason such an adjustment was possible was that all parties - NMFS, The
State of Alaska, and the industry, all had demonstrated strong
commitments to crab conservation in the past. So the idea of an
adjustment never was seen as a ploy to get around scientific reports on
stock status, but a way to incorporate such science into the reality of
the fishery. Such thinking will have to come to New England if this
transition is going to have any chance of success.

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